Introduction
Biological weapons have been used since antiquity. In 184 BC, Hannibal ordered earthen pots to be filled with serpents of every kind and hurled onto the decks of Pergamene warriors. Military leaders during the Middle Ages tossed plague-infected victims over the walls into the city of Kaffa. In the 15th century, Pizzarro presented indigenous peoples of South American with variolacontaminated clothing, and in 1754 the English gave American Indians smallpoxladen blankets. In modern times, concern for the use of biological weapons has increased, particularly in the United States in the aftermath of 9/11, when anthrax-laden letters were sent to members of Congress. This article reviews the definitions of biological weapons and mass casualties. In addition, it discusses the main operational and logistical issues of import in the medical management of mass casualties from the use of biological weapons. Strategies for medical management of specific biological agents will also be highlighted.
Definition of Biological Weapon and Threat
A biological weapon can be defined as "a microorganism (or a toxin derived from it) which causes disease in man, plants or animals or causes deterioration of material." 1 Biologic warfare is the use of biologic agents to kill or sicken people, animals or plants with the intent to intimidate or coerce a government or civilian population to further political or social objectives.
Medical strategies to handle mass casualties from the use of biological weapons Kristi L Koenig, MD, Christopher Kahn, MD, Carl H Schultz, MD Biological weapons are relatively inexpensive, but difficult to deploy effectively, i.e., make into a form such as an aerosolized preparation that can cause harm (weaponization). Some biological agents are easy to obtain whereas others are more closely guarded. For example, anthrax is present in soil worldwide, but there are only two known locations of the smallpox virus (one in the U.S. and one in Russia). These weapons can induce fear of the unknown.
This is analogous to the early days of the AIDS epidemic when modes of transmission for the human immunodeficiency virus were poorly understood.
First responders could be seen responding to such patients in Level A personal protective equipment.
Biological weapons have the potential for dissemination over a large geographic area. Modeling performed by the World Health Organization determined that only 50 kg of weaponized anthrax aerosolized over an urban population of 500,000 persons would result in 95,000 deaths and 125,000
persons becoming ill. The use of 50 kg of weaponized tularemia would kill 30,000 and sicken similar numbers. 2 Clearly, such a scenario would overwhelm the existing health and medical resources of any nation.
An attack may be overt or, more likely, covert. Unless a terrorist announces the attack or uses a biological agent in an obvious manner (e.g., anthrax powder in a letter), realization that an attack has actually occurred may be difficult. There would be no obvious explosion as in the conventional terrorist use of bombs, or the rapid presentation of multiple victims suffering from a clear toxidrome as in the use of a chemical agent, or a quick and reliable method of While the attempt to change the election results was unsuccessful, people did in fact become ill. It was not until years later that investigators determined the outbreak was an act of terrorism.
Indicators of a Bioterrorist Attack
There are several signs that should point to the possibility of a covert biological attack. These include: the occurrence of a single suspected case of an uncommon disease (e.g., smallpox), clusters of similar disease in the same time frame in different locales (e.g., multiple patients with flu-like symptoms presenting to several locations who were all at the same sporting event several days prior), unusual clinical, geographical, or seasonal presentations (e.g., lots of Medical strategies to handle mass casualties from the use of biological weapons Kristi L Koenig, MD, Christopher Kahn, MD, Carl H Schultz, MD "influenza" patients in non-flu season or plague patients in a non-endemic region of the U.S.), and increased deaths in the animal population.
Types of Biologic Agents
The U.S. casualties" and the fact that the effects of the terrorist attack were far-reaching, one could conclude that "mass casualties" did indeed occur.
The absolute number of patients needed to define an event as producing "mass casualties" is less important than the functional impact to the existing health care system. Any incident that overwhelms the resources of a given system at a specific point in time can be considered to be a mass casualty event.
In a classic bioterrorism attack (e.g., covert release of an aerosolized agent over a geographic area), casualties will present over hours to weeks rather than all at once, which is more typical for a chemical or radiological event. This type of mass casualty event produces a public health emergency that will require several Medical strategies to handle mass casualties from the use of biological weapons Kristi L Koenig, MD, Christopher Kahn, MD, Carl H Schultz, MD types of systems and strategies to manage. A more appropriate paradigm than absolute numbers of casualties, however they are defined, is consideration of the functional impact of a bioevent on the local health delivery system. A system such as PICE may be useful in this regard. PICE, or "potential injury-creating event", is a standardized nomenclature using functional terminology to allow concise, accurate communications regarding the geographic and disruptive extent of a mass-casualty incident and the need for additional response assets.
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Operational and Logistical Issues
Incident Management System
The clinical management of casualties exposed to biological agents is similar to clinical care for patients with more common viruses and therefore relatively familiar to most practitioners. There are a few key differences that will be discussed later in the article. It is the operational management aspects that are unfamiliar to most clinicians. An important strategy for orchestrating medical care for mass casualties resulting from exposure to a biological weapon is to implement an Incident Management System (IMS). Each organization (e.g., fire, 
Surge Capacity and Alternate Sites of Care
No matter how good the IMS, if the health care system lacks the capacity to provide patient care to large numbers of casualties, people will die. In modern times, there is little to no excess capacity. This is very cost-efficient under normal circumstances, but problematic following any type of disaster or public health emergency that produces large numbers of casualties. Even a small increase in the number of patients from a bad influenza season stresses the current health care system. Therefore, a strategy to improve system capacity (surge capacity) is critical to optimize preparation and management of mass casualties from bioterrorism.
Barbisch has proposed a model for improving surge capacity that contains 3 components: "Staff," "Stuff," and "Structure," with "Structure" consisting of both Medical strategies to handle mass casualties from the use of biological weapons Kristi L Koenig, MD, Christopher Kahn, MD, Carl H Schultz, MD the management infrastructure as well as the physical buildings required to provide patient care. 7, 8 Using this model, personnel, supplies, equipment, physical space, and a management infrastructure consistent with the needs of the event would be identified and provided.
One strategy for dealing with mass casualties from a bioterrorist event is
to use alternate sites of care. Traditionally, hospitals have been thought of as the major or only places for medical care. However, hospital resources can easily be exceeded, or the hospital could become non-functional due to contamination.
Therefore, to emergently expand patient care capacity, and as required by JCAHO standards, all facilities must designate appropriate alternate sites of care. 9, 10 Though initially designed for earthquakes rather than bioterrorism, the Medical Disaster Response concept is one example of such an approach. 11 The local administrative jurisdiction (EMS or public health) should also be involved in community and regional planning for alternate care sites. To adequately staff this expanded capacity, decision-makers should consider innovative concepts to provide emergency credentialing of personnel. One technique is to temporarily grant privileges to providers by honoring the credentialing process of neighboring institutions.
Detection/Epidemiologic Investigation
As mentioned above, the covert release of a biologic agent may be difficult to initially uncover. Therefore, several strategies now exist to potentially improve laboratory personnel must be notified so that they can take appropriate infectious precautions and also so that they will know to test for an agent that may not be 
Multi-Disciplinary Coordination and Communications
Once bioterrorism is suspected, non-traditional partners must be notified and participate in coordination of the event. These include: local law enforcement and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (a terrorist attack is a crime), public health (populations of patients rather than simply individuals are involved), the EMS agency, city/county administration, the Laboratory Response Network (LRN) of the CDC, the media, mortuary affairs, and faith-based leaders.
Clear procedures must be in place to maintain the "chain of evidence" and notify
proper authorities such as public health and the FBI when collecting biological samples. A 24/7 reporting system must be implemented so notifications can be readily made whether it is during normal business hours or 3 a.m. on a Sunday. Back up communications systems, such as radio and television emergency alert systems, are essential since some will not have access to the internet or it may be non-functional for many reasons including a concurrent cyber or electromagnetic pulse terrorist attack.
Quarantine and Isolation
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In situations where exposure from a contagious biological agent occurs, such as plague or smallpox, quarantine of exposed individuals and isolation of ill persons may be necessary. Quarantine authority varies by jurisdiction and has not been invoked for many years in the U.S. The balance between civil liberties and the protection of public health remains a challenge when such interventions are contemplated.
Other Legal Aspects
In addition to quarantine legislation, several other laws and regulations may be problematic in the face of mass casualties from bioterrorism. These include Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act/Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (COBRA/EMTALA) regulations that normally limit transfer of patients to specific pre-defined circumstances and require facilities with capability and capacity for a higher level of care to accept patients in transfer, and Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) privacy regulations. There is an emergency exception in the HIPAA regulations, but case law is lacking to determine whether this would be sufficient to allow appropriate medical information to be transmitted in a mass casualty situation.
Triage
In the setting of mass casualties, the goal of triage shifts from doing the best for an individual to "doing the most good for the most patients." There are several systems available to manage a large influx of casualties. In the U.S., the most common system for initial triage is START (Simple Triage And Rapid Treatment). Of note, patients exposed to a contagious biologic agent must be triaged in a manner that minimizes the possibility of transmitting the infectious agent to others. 13 
Securing Healthcare Facilities
In the event of a biological attack, hospitals will become a natural center of public attention. However, maximizing public health will require limiting access to contagious victims. Additionally, crime victims are typically afforded some protection by local authorities. As a consequence, a security plan must be in place that limits access to the hospital or the appropriate ward(s) so only authorized personnel and, if appropriate, patient visitors may enter. It is also possible that hospitals could be the site of an attack. Attention to current threat profiles is an essential component of ongoing hospital security. Finally, some patients may wish to leave against medical advice. While each patient's right to accept, decline, or modify therapy must be respected, it may become necessary to involuntarily isolate exposed victims (e.g., plague victims) until lack of contagion can be assured. This will likely require close collaboration between hospital security, local law enforcement, and public health authorities. 
Decontamination
In general, decontamination would be unnecessary after a covert exposure to a biological agent. By the time the release was detected (usually several days), most individuals will have changed clothes and showered.
However, certain types of events sometimes termed "SIDS events" (suddenimpact, defined-scene) could involve biological weapons (e.g., anthrax powder) and would require standard decontamination of patients via the "Strip and
Shower" method with soap and water. 14 Otherwise, events likely to cause mass casualties would probably involve release of an aerosolized agent with patients presenting with symptoms days later. While these patients may be contagious, they would not require decontamination.
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for Health Care Providers
Medical strategies to handle mass casualties from the use of biological weapons Kristi L Koenig, MD, Christopher Kahn, MD, Carl H Schultz, MD Standard precautions should be used for all patient encounters. In addition, for those agents that are spread person-to-person, the respiratory droplet mode is the most common route of transmission. Therefore, appropriate respiratory PPE must be donned. Ideally, the types of masks required would be determined after identification of the infectious agent to include its size and degree of transmissibility. There is some controversy regarding what types of masks would be protective if the agent is unknown. For agents transmitted by respiratory droplets, an N-95 mask would theoretically be adequate. Fomites of this size should be effectively trapped. When dealing with agents such as smallpox, however, these masks may be less effective. The smallpox virus remains infectious for hours outside the body. It is possible the viral particle itself could become aerosolized. Due to its small size, the variola virus could penetrate an N-95 mask. In this situation, a HEPA filter mask might be more appropriate. This issue is currently unresolved.
Stockpiling
A key consideration in the strategic planning for mass casualties from biologic agents is stockpiling of necessary medications, supplies, and equipment.
Since most hospitals employ a "just-in-time" strategy for providing pharmaceuticals and equipment to their patients on a daily basis, the ability to rapidly expand resources to meet the needs of a large influx of casualties does Medical strategies to handle mass casualties from the use of biological weapons Kristi L Koenig, MD, Christopher Kahn, MD, Carl H Schultz, MD not exist. This mimics the lack of surge capacity for other items, such as physical space, hospital beds, and personnel.
To identify the components of a stockpile, hospitals and laboratories should perform a hazards vulnerability analysis. This examination will determine the events that pose the greatest threat. An inventory of supplies and equipment can then be compiled to address these threats. One type of equipment that is likely to be in short supply after a biological attack is ventilators. Consideration should be given to purchasing portable disposable ventilators and training staff in their use. In addition, family members may need to be trained ad-hoc on bagvalve-mask techniques to keep their relatives alive.
In terms of pharmaceutical stockpiling strategies, a key question is how quickly each intervention would be needed. If the event unfolds quickly, such as a toxin exposure, storage of antidotes must be close by. Drugs that arrive after 6 to 12 hours will have little impact. In dealing with mass casualties from an anthrax release, storage of antibiotics at a more distant location is acceptable. It will take several days for the disaster to fully develop and there is time to request additional antibiotics and other equipment from a remote location. In general, a combination of local, regional, statewide, and federal caches is the ideal approach. Care must be taken that multiple entities are not dependent on the same supplier. In the case of a bioevent, casualties are likely to be widespread and medications may be in demand from multiple sources. Ideally, medications and other perishable items from the stockpile could be rotated into local or regional usage to minimize losses.
Mass prophylaxis and Vaccination
Post-exposure vaccination and antibiotic or antiviral prophylaxis are important strategies to decrease morbidity and mortality after a bioterrorist event.
It is critical to identify the health care providers and other personnel that are essential to the response effort and ensure that these individuals receive these early interventions. Special attention should be paid to healthcare personnel and laboratory personnel who may have had, or are likely to have, early exposure to the biological agent. The scope of the event may require that distributions be made from the Strategic National Stockpile or another regional resource to ensure sufficient and timely distribution of prophylactic materials.
Psychological Aspects
As was noted so vividly in the fall of 2001, the effects of a biological attack are likely to spread far beyond those who have documented exposure. Following the anthrax attacks in Florida and the US Congress, healthcare and emergency response services across the country spent months responding to nervous citizens who believed they may have been exposed as well. Typical seasonal upper respiratory infections caused concern for inhalational anthrax.
A key component of any bioevent response will be providing psychological care to exposed victims, involved emergency personnel, affected communities, Medical strategies to handle mass casualties from the use of biological weapons Kristi L Koenig, MD, Christopher Kahn, MD, Carl H Schultz, MD and the country at large. Close integration with health risk communicators may help to mitigate some of the psychological trauma which is likely to follow an attack. Although the myth of panic is often propagated, in reality panic is unlikely to occur. 15 Yet, the incremental effects of increased call volume, hazardous materials team responses, and concerned patients with unexplained medical symptoms visiting the emergency departments can prove to be highly detrimental to public health and emergency response services.
Providers -who will come to work?
A Inclusion of local religious leaders into ongoing planning/drill events involving mortuary affairs may help mitigate some of these concerns. Religion-neutral, compassionately devised health risk communications via the media as well as individual discussions at the time of death notification may also help alleviate public concern. This will enhance the ability of law enforcement and public Medical strategies to handle mass casualties from the use of biological weapons Kristi L Koenig, MD, Christopher Kahn, MD, Carl H Schultz, MD health agencies to carry out their duties while maintaining appropriate respect and dignity for the deceased.
Special populations
Specific populations are likely to be at higher risk of morbidity and mortality as a result of a bioevent. These include geriatric, pediatric, and pregnant persons, as well as those with limited communications abilities due to physical (deafness, blindness), cognitive (mental illness), or language barriers.
Persons who are homebound or who are reliant on home health nursing and materials may also be at higher risk, as are persons who are in high-density populations such as shelters and prisons. Particular attention should be given to education and surveillance in these populations with a tendency toward early quarantine/isolation and treatment as needed.
Conclusion
The specter of bioterrorism presents a challenging addition to the already difficult problem of managing mass casualties. Key necessities for preparation, mitigation, response to, and recovery from these events include a high index of suspicion for bioterrorism events, ready access to current diagnostic and treatment information, and pre-existing relationships between medical, public health, and law enforcement agencies. Careful attention to education efforts and Medical strategies to handle mass casualties from the use of biological weapons Kristi L Koenig, MD, Christopher Kahn, MD, Carl H Schultz, MD health risk communications planning can also help to mitigate physical and psychological casualties as well as minimize attrition among response personnel.
Healthcare facilities and response agencies must be prepared to triage and treat large numbers of patients while protecting them and the responding personnel from further harm. Finally, the importance of an effective incident management system for overall incident response coordination cannot be overemphasized.
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